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How	majoritarianism	endures	in	the	structures	of	the
UK’s	devolved	institutions
Scotland	and	Wales’	devolved	political	institutions,	elected	under	proportional	Additional	Member
electoral	systems,	were	intended	to	produce	a	more	consensual	political	culture.	However,
writes	Felicity	Matthews,	although	their	electoral	rules	have	increased	the	proportionality	of
representation,	the	structures	of	the	Scottish	Parliament	and	National	Assembly	for	Wales	have	meant
that	a	more	consensual	approach	to	policy-making	has	been	more	limited	than	might	have	been
expected.
This	year,	the	Scotland	Act	1998	and	the	Government	of	Wales	Act	1998	celebrate	their	twentieth	anniversary.	Few
would	disagree	that	the	passage	of	these	acts,	which	established	the	Scottish	Parliament	and	National	Assembly	for
Wales,	was	an	important	watershed	in	the	United	Kingdom’s	majoritarian	tradition.	This	milestone	anniversary
provides	a	timely	opportunity	to	reflect	on	the	extent	to	which	devolution	has	delivered	the	‘new	politics’	that	was
widely	anticipated;	and	in	my	recently	published	article	in	The	British	Journal	of	Politics	and	International	Relations,	I
examine	the	extent	to	which	devolution	has	‘made	a	difference’	by	systematically	comparing	the	institutional
architecture	of	the	Scottish	Parliament	and	National	Assembly	for	Wales	with	that	of	Westminster.
When	the	first	elections	to	the	Scottish	Parliament	and	National	Assembly	for	Wales	were	held,	hopes	were	high.
Indeed,	a	number	of	observers	hailed	devolution	as	part	of	a	‘full-blooded	constitutional	revolution’,	which	would
‘drag…	the	political	system	away	from	an	extreme	version	of	majoritarian	democracy	towards	a	more	institutionally
consensual	model’.	Such	optimism	was	perhaps	unsurprising,	as	devolution	had	been	presented	to	the	people	of
Scotland	and	Wales	as	addressing	the	democratic	deficits	of	Westminster	majoritarianism.	Devolution,	the
government	declared,	would	‘strengthen	democratic	control	and	make	government	more	accountable	to	the	people
of	Scotland’	(Cm	3658	1997:	vii)	and	would	‘liberate	the	energy	of	the	Welsh	people	to	make	a	real	difference	[via]	a
modern,	progressive	and	inclusive	democratic	institution’	(Cm	3718,	1997:	10,	24).
Yet	despite	these	normative	claims,	there	is	no	automatic	reason	to	assume	that	devolution	forges	a	closer
connection	between	voters	and	legislators.	Recognising	this,	my	article	examines	the	institutional	inputs	that
structure	these	connections,	and	compares	the	extent	to	which	factors	such	as	electoral	rules	and	committee
systems	have	facilitated	a	more	proportional	dispersal	of	electoral	payoffs.	To	do	so,	the	article	first	focuses	office
payoffs	and	applies	a	series	of	measures	to	capture	the	proportionality	of	representation	in	terms	of	votes	cast,	seats
won	and	offices	held.	The	article	then	focuses	on	the	alternative	means	through	which	non-government
parliamentarians	can	achieve	policy	payoffs,	and	develops	a	series	of	measures	to	gauge	the	capacity	of	each
parliament	to	affect	policymaking	via	its	committees	and	plenary	session.
By	distinguishing	between	office	payoffs	and	policy	payoffs,	my	analysis	paints	a	more	nuanced	picture	of	the	extent
to	which	devolution	has	made	a	difference.	In	terms	of	office	payoffs,	the	Additional	Member	electoral	systems	used
in	Scotland	and	Wales	have	ensured	a	closer	congruence	between	party	competition	and	the	dispersal	of	seats,
closing	the	gap	between	the	effective	number	of	electoral	parties	and	effective	number	of	parliamentary	parties.
However,	a	more	proportional	electoral	system	has	not	fostered	a	more	collegial	approach	to	the	sharing	of
executive	power,	and	on	several	occasions,	plurality-winning	parties	have	demonstrated	a	clear	preference	for
governing	alone,	often	eschewing	coalition	for	minority	government.	This	suggests	that	‘a	Westminster	culture	and
frame	of	reference’	has	limited	the	effect	of	increased	legislative	proportionality	on	subsequent	patterns	of
government	formation.	Indeed,	across	the	three	domains	the	average	difference	in	the	effective	number	of	cabinet
parties	is	negligible.
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Yet	in	terms	of	policy	payoffs,	evidence	suggests	that	the	more	proportional	dispersal	of	parliamentary	seats	in	the
Scottish	Parliament	and	National	Assembly	for	Wales	has	created	the	conditions	for	non-government	parties	to	exert
influence,	particularly	in	times	of	minority	government.	This	contrasts	sharply	with	Westminster	where	the	(in	general)
domination	of	the	House	of	Commons	by	majority	governments	has	limited	the	leverage	of	non-government	parties
on	the	floor	of	the	House.	Nonetheless,	my	analysis	also	shows	that	Westminster’s	committee	system	provides	a
relatively	important	vehicle	for	opposition	influence,	and	that	successive	reforms	in	recent	years	have	bolstered	the
capacity	of	select	committees.	This	is	underlined	by	the	increasingly	willingness	of	select	committees	to	move
beyond	their	traditional	‘police	patrol’	mode	of	executive	oversight,	sounding	‘fire	alarms’	on	issues	including	child
sexual	exploitation,	phone-hacking	and	tax	evasion.	Indeed,	the	capacity	of	Westminster’s	committees	compares
favourably	with	their	Scottish	and	Welsh	counterparts,	which	have	been	subject	to	a	number	of	institutional
constraints.
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Taken	together,	these	findings	reveal	that	in	terms	of	electoral	payoffs	(that	is,	office	and	policy	payoffs),	the	systems
of	devolved	government	in	Scotland	and	Wales	have	departed	from	the	norms	of	majoritarianism,	but	to	a	more
modest	degree	than	the	rhetoric	of	‘new	politics’	would	imply.	This	relatively	small	shift	not	only	underlines	the	extent
to	which	the	architecture	of	devolution	has	been	constrained	by	a	centrally	designed	framework	derived	from
Westminster	practice	but	also	is	suggestive	of	the	way	in	which	the	culture	of	majoritarianism	has	continued	to	imbue
governing	practice,	particularly	with	regard	to	patterns	of	government	formation.	Nonetheless,	the	introduction	of	a
more	proportional	electoral	system	for	the	Scottish	Parliament	and	National	Assembly	for	Wales	has	had	a	clear
effect	in	terms	of	closing	the	gap	between	votes	cast	and	seats	won,	and	despite	limitations	to	the	structures	of
opposition	influence	(notably	the	committee	system),	the	increased	vote	basis	of	the	legislature	has	ensured	that	a
more	substantial	majority	of	voters	are	‘present’	in	the	policy	process.	Indeed,	by	simulating	the	outcomes	of	the
elections	to	the	Scottish	Parliament	and	National	Assembly	for	Wales	under	Westminster’s	electoral	rules	(and	vice
versa),	the	seemingly	modest	changes	wrought	by	two	regional	systems	of	government	are	made	plain.
As	the	Scottish	Parliament	and	National	Assembly	for	Wales	enter	their	twentieth	year,	these	findings	are	both
salient	and	timely.	My	analysis	has	isolated	the	effects	of	specific	institutional	structures	on	the	dispersal	of	electoral
payoffs,	which	underlines	the	potential	of	a	multi-dimensional	reform	agenda	for	improving	proportionality	(i.e.
electoral	reform)	and	enhancing	the	conditions	for	opposition	influence	(i.e.	legislative	committee	reform).	Moreover,
the	Scotland	Act	2016	and	Wales	Act	2017	have	transferred	important	powers	relating	to	electoral	rules,	constituency
boundaries	and	legislative	structures.	The	devolved	governments	now	have	their	disposal	key	constitutional	levers,
which	if	used	effectively	could	deliver	the	elusive	‘sweet-spot’	between	representation	and	accountability.	However,
whether	such	a	constitutional	entrepreneur	will	emerge	remains	an	open	question,	and	while	institutional	reform	can
support	a	more	consensual	approach	to	policymaking,	a	genuine	shift	in	political	culture	demands	commitment	and
will,	both	of	which	appear	to	be	in	short	supply.
This	article	first	appeared	on	Democratic	Audit,	and	it	represents	the	views	of	the	authors	and	not	those	of	LSE
Brexit.
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It	draws	on	the	author’s	article	‘Does	decentralisation	make	a	difference?	Comparing	the	democratic	performance	of
central	and	regional	governing	systems	in	the	United	Kingdom’,	published	in	The	British	Journal	of	Politics	and
International	Relations.
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